






Abstract: Researchers measure crowd-out around one level of charity output to identify whether giving is 
motivated by altruism and/or warm-glow.  However crowd-out depends on output, implying first that the power 
to reject pure altruism varies, and second that a single measurement of incomplete crowd-out can be 
rationalized by many different preferences. By instead measuring crowd-out at different output levels we allow 
both for identification	and	for	a novel and direct test of impure altruism.  Using a new experimental design 
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dollar	 lump‐sum	 tax	 used	 to	 increase	 the	 charity’s	 output	 is	 predicted	 to	 decrease	 the	 donor’s	












null	 hypothesis	 of	 pure	 altruism/complete	 crowd‐out	 is	 tested	 against	 the	 alternative	 of	 impure	
altruism/incomplete	crowd‐out.3	This	test	has	always	been	carried	out	around	one	level	of	the	charity’s	






















output	 decreases,	 and	 so	 an	 impure	 altruist’s	 marginal	 motive	 for	 giving	 shifts	 away	 from	 being	
influenced	by	altruism	(the	benefit	of	increasing	output)	toward	being	influenced	by	warm‐glow	(the	
private	benefit	 of	making	 the	 gift).	 This	 shift	 in	marginal	motive	 toward	warm‐glow	decreases	how	
substitutable	donations	by	self	and	others	are,	and	in	turn	decreases	crowd‐out.	Thus,	for	a	given	set	of	




identifying	 preferences.	 First,	 the	 power	 to	 reject	 pure	 altruism/complete	 crowd‐out	 from	 a	 single	
crowd‐out	measurement	depends	on	the	output	level	where	it	is	measured.	Second,	because	crowd‐out	






































and	 individual‐specific	 preferences,	 with	 the	 latter	 capturing	 the	 natural	 heterogeneity	 in	 motives	
across	individuals.	While	our	direct	test	of	impure	altruism	makes	it	possible	to	conclude	that	giving	is	










the	charity’s	output	G,	a	public	good.		Normalizing	prices,	i’s	budget	constraint	is	ݔ௜ ൅ ݃௜ ൑ ݓ௜,	where	gi	
is	her	gift	to	the	charity	and	wi	is	her	income.	ܩ ൌ ∑ ݃௜௡௜ୀଵ 	denotes	the	sum	of	the	individual	gifts,	and	







others	 is	 a	 one‐for‐one	 decrease	 in	 her	 contribution	 and	 crowd‐out	 is	 predicted	 to	 be	
complete	 ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ ൌ െ1.		
	











giving‐by‐others:	ܩ∗ ൌ ݍሺݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜, ܩି௜ሻ.6	Donations	by	self	and	others	are	no	longer	perfect	substitutes,	
and	the	‘income’	effects	with	respect	to	own	income	dG*/dwi	≜	q1	and	giving‐by‐others	dG*/dG‐i	≜	q1	+	
q2	are	no	longer	equal.	Assuming	that	warm‐glow	is	a	normal	good,	q2	>	0,	the	individual’s	desired	charity	










output	level	by	q2		>	0,	securing	less	than	complete	crowd‐out:	d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ ൌ െ1 ൅ ݍଶ.		
	
In	testing	motives	for	giving,	researchers	hold	the	complete	crowd‐out	prediction	of	pure	altruism	as	











deviate	 from	 pure	 altruism.	 To	 demonstrate,	 consider	 the	 Cobb‐Douglas	 impure	 altruism	 utility	
function:			
U(xi,	G,	gi)			=			(1	−	α	−	β)	ln	xi		+		α	ln	G		+		β	ln	gi.	 	 	 (1)	
	
                                                          
6	While	the	first	order	condition	of	a	pure	altruist	is		െܷ௫ሺݔ௜, ܩሻ ൅ ܷீሺݔ௜, ܩሻ ൌ 0,	that	of	an	impure	altruist	adds	a	
second	 marginal‐benefit‐of‐giving	 term,	 i.e.,	 െܷ௫ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ܷீሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ௚ܷ೔ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൌ 0,	








out	 measurements	 that	 are	 not	 significantly	 different	 (one	 is	 complete,	 the	 other	 is	 similar	 to	 Andreoni’s).		


















Second,	 to	 see	 that	 measuring	 crowd‐out	 around	 a	 single	 output	 level	 cannot	 identify	 the	 relative	










                                                          
8	The	weight	on	warm‐glow,	β,	relative	to	overall	generosity,	α+β,	is	0.2	(=β/α+β).	
α = .40, β = .10
α = .27,  β = .01
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In	 the	 next	 section,	we	 introduce	 a	 new	 experimental	 design	 that	 controls	 the	 charity’s	 output	 and	
measures	crowd‐out	at	two	output	levels.	That	is,	we	vary	the	level	of	giving‐by‐others	and	measure	
crowd‐out	at	two	levels	of	G‐i:	a	low	and	a	high	level.	We	use	these	crowd‐out	measurements	to	both	
demonstrate	 that	 rejection	 of	 pure	 altruism	depends	 on	where	 the	 hypothesis	 is	 tested,	 and	 to	 test	
impure	altruism’s	decreasing	crowd‐out	prediction.	Eliciting	contributions	across	six	different	budgets,	






each	 participant’s	 gift	 determines	 the	 final	 and	 total	 output	 for	 an	 “individualized”	 charity.	 We	
collaborated	with	a	chapter	of	the	American	Red	Cross	to	give	participants	the	opportunity	to	help	a	
child	in	need	in	a	way	no	one	outside	the	experiment	was	doing.	Specifically,	in	the	event	of	a	fire,	the	
chapter	 helps	 affected	 families	 find	 temporary	 shelter	 and	 provides	 them	 with	 clothing,	 essential	








higher	 the	 initial	 level	 of	 giving‐by‐others.	 The	marginal	motive	 for	 giving	monotonically	moves	 from	 impure	
altruism	to	pure	warm‐glow	(ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ → 1	).	Third,	we	present	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	separable	impure	 altruism	 utility	 functions	 to	 have	 monotonically	 decreasing	 unfunded	 crowd‐out.	 Appendix	 A	
demonstrates	 that	a	 test	of	 impure	altruism’s	decreasing	crowd‐out	prediction	must	be	conducted	 jointly	with	
some	restrictions	on	preferences.	We	offer	three	perspectives.	First,	absent	restrictions,	the	impure	altruism	model	
is	void	of	testable	predictions,	other	than	the	assumption	that	q2	>	0.	Second,	previous	empirical	and	experimental	























Building	on	Andreoni	 and	Miller	 (2002)	and	Fisman	et	 al.	 (2007)	we	use	a	within‐subject	design	 to	
identify	 individual	 preferences.12	 Each	 participant	 faced	 six	 budgets	 received	 in	 one	 of	 six	 random	
orders.	The	six	budgets	are	summarized	in	Table	1.	Each	budget	indicated	the	participant’s	endowment,	
ݓ௜,	and	the	foundation’s	fixed	donation,	ܩି௜.	For	each	budget,	the	participant	was	free	to	give	any	portion	
of	 the	 endowment	 to	 the	 child,	݃௜.	 For	 example	 for	 Budget	 1	 the	 participant	was	 informed	 that	 the	
foundation	would	donate	$4	toward	books	for	the	child,	and	that	the	participant	had	an	endowment	of	
$40	that	she	could	allocate	between	herself	and	the	child.	Any	amount	allocated	to	the	child	would	be	




                                                          











be	 rationalized	 by	 altruistic	 preferences.	 Using	 the	 within‐subject	 variation,	 both	 studies	 point	 to	 individual	
heterogeneity	and	estimate	pure	altruism	preferences	(CES).	Identification	of	individual	preferences	requires	a	
within‐subject	 design.	 Empirically	 there	 is	 limited	 evidence	 that	 such	 elicitation	 influences	 average	 choices.	
Theoretically	 in	 paying	 for	 only	 one	 decision	 identification	 is	 not	 compromised	 by	 risk	 aversion	 provided	

















1	 4	 40	 44	
2	 10	 40	 50	
3	 28	 40	 68	
4	 34	 40	 74	
5	 4	 46	 50	













corresponding	lump‐sum	tax—so‐called	“unfunded”	crowd‐out:	d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ െ1൅ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ.	Recall	
that	 under	 pure	 warm‐glow,	 giving‐by‐others	 has	 no	 effect	 on	 the	 individual’s	 contribution,	 hence	









participants	 given	 answers	 to	 the	 quiz.	 These	 answers	were	 carefully	 reviewed	 before	 participants	
proceeded	to	the	decision	task.	Using	pen	and	paper,	participants	made	contribution	decisions	for	each	
of	the	six	budgets.	When	all	decision	forms	were	collected,	a	number	between	1	and	6	was	drawn	to	
determine	 which	 decision	 would	 be	 implemented.	 Payments	 were	 prepared	 while	 participants	
completed	a	questionnaire.		
	









relinquishing	 their	 anonymity	 if	 they	wanted	 to	 receive	 an	 acknowledgement	directly	 from	 the	Red	
Cross.	Once	the	decision	task	was	completed,	the	participant	placed	the	decision	form	in	the	envelope.	




To	 assure	 participants	 that	 the	 experimental	 procedures	 were	 followed,	 we	 used	 a	 verification	
procedure	 similar	 to	 Eckel	 et	 al.	 (2005).	 During	 the	 instruction	 phase	 we	 randomly	 selected	 one	
participant	to	be	a	monitor.	The	monitor	oversaw	all	procedures	of	the	experiment,	and	reported	to	the	
























with	 pure	 altruism,	 we	 cannot	 reject	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 this	 degree	 of	 crowd‐out	 is	 complete	
(H0:│d݃௜∗/dܩି௜|ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔│≥	1	has	p	=	.255).	Had	we	followed	the	procedures	of	previous	experiments	












	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Linear	model	 	 Accounting	for	corner	decisions	
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15	Comparing	the	estimates	of	crowd‐out	from	column	5	with	the	estimates	from	columns	3	and	4	indicates	slight	































the	warm‐glow	component	 is	significantly	greater	 than	zero,	 implying	rejection	of	 the	pure	altruism	
model.	However,	 the	warm‐glow	component	 is	 relatively	small.	With	 the	estimate	on	altruism	being	
0.594,	the	weight	placed	on	warm‐glow	relative	to	overall	generosity,	α+β,	is	0.034	(β/α+β).19	The	0.902	
estimate	of	the	correlation	coefficient	ρ	indicates	that	there	is	substantial	heterogeneity	in	participants’	







α	 0.594		 0.025	 0.000	
β	 0.021	 0.009	 0.022	





                                                          
18	Estimates	of	α	and	β	are	calculated	using	maximum	likelihood,	assuming	that	uib	and	ei	are	normally	distributed.	
To	 calculate	 the	multivariate	normal	probabilities	when	gib	 =	0	 and	when	gib	 =	wib	we	use	 STATA’s	maximum	

















glow	 preference	 parameters.	 The	 magnitude	 of	 altruism	 is	 shown	 along	 the	 vertical	 axis,	 and	 the	
magnitude	of	warm‐glow	along	the	horizontal	axis.	Points	on	the	vertical	axis	represent	participants	
motivated	 by	 pure	 altruism,	 points	 in	 the	 interior	 represent	 individuals	 whose	 donations	 were	
motivated	by	impure	altruism,	and	points	on	the	horizontal	axis	represent	participants	motivated	by	
































and	 to	 test	 its	 prediction	 of	 complete	 crowd‐out	 by	 measuring	 crowd‐out	 around	 a	 single	 level	 of	
charitable	 output.	 In	 rejecting	 complete	 crowd‐out,	 impure	 altruism	 has	 been	 accepted	 as	 the	
alternative.		
	
If	 impure	altruism	 is	 the	 “true”	model,	we	show	 that	one	crowd‐out	measurement	 is	 insufficient	 for	




relative	 weight	 placed	 on	 altruism	 and	 warm‐glow	 preferences.	 In	 fact,	 a	 single	 measurement	 of	
incomplete	crowd‐out	is	consistent	not	only	with	impure	altruism,	but	also	with	pure	warm‐glow	giving.	












on	 preferences	 can	 be	 misled	 by	 a	 single	 crowd‐out	 measurement.	 Second,	 it	 provides	 the	 first	
confirmation	 of	 the	 direct	 test	 of	 impure	 altruism:	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 that	 crowd‐out	
decreases	with	 output.	 Third,	 it	 demonstrates	 how	 structural	 estimates	 of	 altruism	 and	warm‐glow	
preferences	can	be	inferred	with	multiple	measurements	of	crowd‐out.	
	
The central implication of our study is methodological: inference on preferences for giving requires 
more than one crowd-out measurement. This finding has implications for both experimental and non-
experimental studies. In lab and field experiments the change in output is secured by manipulating 
the amount given-by-others to an existing charity, and when using non-experimental data the change 
in output is secured by comparing different points in time over which charity funding changes. In 
measuring crowd-out around more than one output level, existing practice merely has to be extended 
to more than one change in output.  
	
Our	 finding	 that	 crowd‐out	 decreases	 is	 essential	 for	 understanding	 motives	 for	 giving	 and	 for	
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In	 this	 appendix	we	 derive	 three	 results.	 First,	 we	 derive	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 balanced‐budget	
crowd‐out	( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀିௗீష೔ሻ	to	be	monotonically	decreasing	in	giving‐by‐others.	Second,	we	show	that	




denotes	private	consumption,	G	the	charity’s	output,	and	gi	i’s	gift	to	the	charity.	ܩ ൌ ∑ ݃௜௡௜ୀଵ 	is	the	sum	
of	 the	 charitable	 gifts,	 and	 ܩି௜ ൌ ∑ ݃௝௝ஷ௜ 	 the	 amount	 given‐by‐others.	 Normalizing	 prizes	 i’s	 budget	
constraint	is:	ݔ௜ ൅ ݃௜ ൑ ݓ௜,	where	wi	denotes	own	income.	Adding	ܩି௜	to	both	sides	the	budget	constraint	
can	be	re‐written	as:	ݔ௜ ൅ ܩ ൑ ݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜.	Setting	݃௜ ൌ ܩ െ ܩ௜	the	resulting	first‐order	condition	equals:	
	 		
	
െܷ௫ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ܷீሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൅ ௚ܷ೔ሺݔ௜, ܩ, ܩ െ ܩି௜ሻ ൌ 0.	 	 	 (A.1)	
	
The	 Engel	 curve	 for	 the	 public	 good	 derived	 from	 the	 first‐order	 condition	 is	 a	 function	 of	 two	
arguments,	social	income	(ܼ௜ ൌ ݓ௜ ൅ ܩି௜ሻ	and	giving‐by‐others	(ܩି௜ሻ	
	






gi*	=	−G‐i	+	q(wi	+	G‐i,	G‐i)	 	 	 	
	
and	
dgi*	=	−dG‐i	+	q1[dwi	+	dG‐i]	 +		q2	dG‐i	 	 	
	







warm‐glow	only	 (no	altruism),	crowd‐out	 in	response	 to	an	unfunded	 increase	 in	G‐i	 is	 ୢ௚೔
∗
ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ




altruists	 are	predicted	 to	 respond	 to	 changes	 in	 giving	 by	others,	 unfunded	 crowd‐out	 ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ ൌ

































ௗீష೔ ൌ ܷீீீ	ሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ ൐ 0	 	 	 	 	 (A.6)	
	
ௗ௎೒೒
ௗீష೔ ൌ 	 ௚ܷ௚௚
ௗ௚∗
ௗீష೔ ൌ ௚ܷ௚௚	ሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ െ 1ሻ ൏ 0	 	 	 	 	 (A.7)	
	
where	 the	 inequalities	 follow	 from	 the	assumed	positive	 third	derivatives.	Now	differentiating	 (A.4)	
with	respect	to	G‐i:	
	



























preferences	also	have	monotonically	decreasing	unfunded	crowd‐out	( ୢ௚೔∗ୢீష೔ |ௗ௪೔ୀ଴ → 0),	and	presents	a	
set	of	 conditions	on	preferences	such	 that	decreasing	unfunded	crowd‐out	 is	monotonic—hence	 the	









ݍଵ ൅	ݍଶ ൌ 	 ଵଶ ቂ1 ൅ 	ߙ ൅
ே
ௌభ మൗ ቃ	 	 	 	 	 (A.10)	
	
where:	
	 	 	 ܰ ≡ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶܩି௜ ൅ ሾሺߚ െ ߙሻ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻߙሿݓ௜	 	 	 	 (A.11)	
	










ௗீష೔ቃ	 	 	 	 (A.13)	
	
Noting	that	 ௗேௗீష೔ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ
ଶ	and	 ௗௌௗீష೔ ൌ 2ܰ,	the	term	in	square	brackets	on	the	right‐hand	side	of	(A.13)	
reduces	to	ܵሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ െ ܰଶ,	and	(A.11)	and	(A.12)	used	to	show:	
	
	 	 ܵሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ െ ܰଶ ൌ 	 ሼሺߙ ൅ ߚሻଶሺ1 െ ߙሻଶ െ ሾሺߚ െ ߙሻ ൅ ሺߙ ൅ ߚሻߙሿଶሽݓ௜ଶ	
(A.14)	







































ܰݑ݉݁ݎܽݐ݋ݎ ቊ݀ሺݍଵ ൅	ݍଶሻ݀ܩି௜ ቋ ൌ 	ܷீீ	൫ܷ௫௫௫ െ ௚ܷ௚௚൯ሺ1 െ ݍଵ െ ݍଶሻ െ ൫ܷ௫௫ 	൅	 ௚ܷ௚൯	ܷீீீሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (A.18)	
	 	 	 	 ൌ 	 ଵ௎ೣೣ	ା	௎೒೒ା௎ಸಸ ቂܷீீ









Remark:	Positive	third	derivatives	and	 ௚ܷ௚௚ ൐ ܷ௫௫௫	would	satisfy	the	condition	in	Proposition	2	and	
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Once	 all	 decision	 forms	 have	 been	 collected	 all	 participants	 will	 be	 given	 a	 survey.	 While	 you	 are	
completing	the	survey	the	monitor	will	walk	with	two	assistants	to	a	separate	room	to	oversee	that	the	








extent	 to	 which	 the	 instructions	 were	 followed	 as	 described	 in	 the	 instructions.	 Once	 you	 have	
completed	your	survey	you	may	come	to	the	front	to	collect	your	payment	by	showing	your	claim	check.		
An	assistant	who	has	not	seen	your	decision	form	will	hand	you	the	sealed	envelope	with	your	payment.			
	
After	the	study	is	completed	the	monitor	and	an	assistant	will	walk	to	the	nearest	mailbox	(on	Forbes	
next	to	the	Hillman	Library)	where	the	monitor	will	drop	the	envelope	in	the	mailbox.	To	prove	that	all	
procedures	are	followed	the	monitor	will	be	asked	to	sign	a	certificate	to	that	effect.	This	certificate	will	
be	posted	outside	4916	Posvar	Hall.	
	
Upon	receipt	of	the	check	and	acknowledgment	form	the	American	Red	Cross	will	send	a	letter	affirming	
that	the	check	has	been	used	to	buy	books	for	the	child	according	to	the	description	above.	This	letter	
will	be	posted	outside	4916	Posvar	Hall.	
	
If	you	are	the	monitor	of	this	study	please	identify	yourself	by	coming	to	the	front	of	the	room	now.	
	
If	you	have	any	questions	about	the	procedures,	please	raise	your	hand	now	and	one	of	us	will	come	to	
your	seat	to	answer	your	question.	
	
Before	we	proceed	to	the	decision	task	we	want	you	to	complete	a	brief	quiz,	to	make	sure	you	know	
how	everything	will	be	calculated.	
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